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Summary
The intricacies of international land-use change and forestry 
policy reflect the temporal, technical and political difficulty of 
integrating biological systems and climate change mitigation. 
The plethora of co-existing policies with varied technical 
rules, accreditation requirements, accounting methods, market 
registries, etc., disguise the unequal efficacies of each mechanism. 
This work explores the co-evolution and convergence of 
Australian voluntary and mandatory climate-related policies 
at the biosequestration–bioenergy interface. Currently, there 
are temporal differences between the fast-evolving and precise 
climate-change mechanisms, and the long-term ‘permanence’ 
sought from land use changes encouraged by biosequestration 
instruments. Policy convergence that favours the most efficient, 
appropriate and scientifically substantiated policy mechanisms 
is required. These policies must recognise the fundamental 
biological foundation of biosequestration, bioenergy, biomaterial 
industrial development and other areas such as food security 
and environmental concerns. Policy mechanisms that provide 
administrative simplicity, project longevity and market certainty 
are necessary for rural and regional Australians to cost-effectively 
harness the considerable climate change mitigation potential of 
biological systems.
Keywords: forestry; carbon; policy; climatic change; legislation; 
international agreements; Australia
Introduction
The recent historical diversity of climate-change-related policies 
and markets exemplify the extraordinary temporal and technical 
divides between climatic and policymaking timescales. This 
unique predicament can be symbolised through the interface 
of evolving climate-change policy with a biosequestration, 
bioenergy or biomaterial component. The aims of current carbon 
offsetting and biosequestration policies are to implement very 
long-term arrangements and management procedures for carbon 
biosequestration in the terrestrial landscape. However, the rate of 
evolution (and termination) of related Australian climate policies 
is sharply at odds with the ‘permanence’ required by these policies. 
This work explores the detailed complexity of current national 
and relevant international policy mechanisms and accounting 
methods for biosequestration and related bioenergy. In doing 
so the research demonstrates the significant ambiguity between 
economic value and quantifiable mitigation achieved to date. The 
objective of this research is to distil common policy lineages and 
complexities and their relative efficacy in carbon sequestration 
for climate-change mitigation; the longer-term aim of the work 
is to assist the evolution of appropriate mechanisms to facilitate 
a range of biomass-related industries to achieve climate-change 
mitigation and regional development objectives in Australia.
Where and how to place biosequestration and bioenergy in 
the national mitigation effort is challenging within competing 
(although related) spheres of conservation, primary industries, 
bioenergy and forestry. While fossil fuel combustion emissions 
can be estimated relatively quickly and accurately, emissions 
and biosequestration from land use and forestry activities are 
dependent on complex biological variables that may be manifest 
over very long timescales. This complexity is reflected in the 
provisions for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) 
for the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2008–2012), 
which has required a number of separate decisions, written in 
various documents over decades (Hohne et al. 2007). When the 
Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature in 1997, few would 
have imagined the complexity that would surround LULUCF 
policy (Fry 2007). Differential treatment of the LULUCF sector 
in climate policy is primarily due to the capability of biomass 
to sequester carbon into physical structures, and the associated 
issues regarding a quantification of net biological emissions and 
removals (Hohne et al. 2007). Inappropriate differentiation in 
land use policy can produce unintended consequences in the 
diversity of sectors dependent on limited terrestrial biological 
resource inputs. This indifference to distributive justice, and 
both inter- and intra-generational inequity, flies in the face of 
appropriate differentiation that may integrate the unprecedented 
complexity of global climate-change participants, technology and 
policy development (McDonald 2005).
From 2009 to 2011, both Australia’s Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS) and the Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) sought 
to streamline a number of domestic policies that aimed to achieve 
greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation using biomass–biosequestration 
components (DCC 2008a; DCCEE 2011). In the lead-up to 
the proposed CPRS and CFI introduction, over-reliance on 
‘constructive ambiguity’ between strong domestic interest groups 
arguably stalled the process and any further LULUCF mitigation 83 Mark P. McHenry
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developments. Similarly, the outlook for LULUCF mitigation 
policy internationally is also uncertain. Therefore, judicious 
innovation is required to develop agreeable solutions in future 
negotiations and successive policy mechanisms (Fry 2007; Hohne 
et al. 2007).
The Kyoto Protocol, Australia, LULUCF and 
major policy mechanisms1
Australia’s initial Kyoto Protocol assigned amount units (AAUs) 
for the first 1-y commitment period is 2 957 579 143 AAUs. One 
AAU is equal to one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2-e). 
For Australia to meet its Kyoto Protocol target of 108% above 
1990 emission levels (multiplied by five for each year), the 
nation must not emit more than 2  957  579  143 tCO2-e over the 
period. This target itself is currently under review by the Kyoto 
Protocol expert review team, a nominated international team of 
experts to assess its accuracy. Countries that fail to meet Kyoto 
Protocol targets during the first commitment period may be liable 
for a 30% additional penalty of the difference between their 
actual emissions and their target subtracted from their AAUs in 
a post-2012 commitment period (DCC 2008a).
In simple terms, for Australia to meet the national Kyoto 
Protocol target it must have equivalent Kyoto Protocol units in 
the national registry as the Kyoto Protocol emission target over 
the commitment period. The Australian National Greenhouse 
Gas Inventory (NGGI) accounts for national emissions over 
time. The NGGI accounts for LULUCF-sector changes in the 
calendar year, while all other sectors and the national Kyoto 
Protocol commitments are accounted against financial years. 
Thus, the Australian Kyoto Protocol commitment period is 
technically 2007–2008 to 2011–2012, except for LULUCF, which 
is accounted over the 2008–2012 period2 (DCC 2009a). In the 
Australian LULUCF sector, only emissions from land-use change 
(LUC) activities (reforestation3 and deforestation) are accounted 
towards the Kyoto Protocol target (DCC 2008b). Australia does 
have the option of accounting for Article 3.4 (revegetation, 
forest management, cropland management and grazing land 
management) as a part of the national Kyoto Protocol target. 
However, the natural variability of the continent, combined with 
high costs of monitoring, makes this undertaking expensive and 
impractical (UN and UNFCCC 2002; DCC 2008c; McHenry 
2009). Therefore, Australia is likely to continue to exclude 
Article 3.4 emissions in the NGGI Report to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
relation to the Kyoto Protocol target.
Australia’s forest definition for Kyoto Protocol purposes is a 
stand of trees with a potential height of at least 2 m and crown 
cover of at least 20% in areas greater than 0.2 ha (DCC 2008b). 
This definition allows the inclusion of Australia’s sparse arid 
woodlands in the Kyoto Protocol net–net accounting system 
1 The author apologises in advance for the extensive use of acronyms in this work. 
Unfortunately, this is a reflection of the (often unnecessary) complexity of the 
current policy and technical terminology.
2 For simplicity, this work refers only to a Kyoto Protocol 2008–2012 commitment 
period for all sectors.
3 The term reforestation is used generally in this research, and does not distinguish 
between afforestation and reforestation for practical purposes.
(Fry 2007; Hohne et al. 2007). In terms of Kyoto Protocol 
accounting, removal units (RMUs) are issued on the basis of 
LULUCF sink activities under Articles 3.3 and 3.4. Australia has 
one RMU issued as a result of a net removal of 1 tCO2-e from 
Article 3.3 reforestation activities (DCC 2008b). Removals were 
20.5 MtCO2-e4 in 2008, with a risk buffer of 1.8 MtCO2-e, and 
are expected to remain constant over the 2008–2012 commitment 
period (DCC 2009a).
The vast area of arid land available for reforestation activities 
in Australia presents a potentially cost-effective removal option 
that most countries do not enjoy. Other Australian competitive 
advantages negotiated into the Kyoto Protocol include the now 
infamous ‘Australia clause’, contained in Article 3.7. This allows 
Australia to subtract emission removals by sinks from aggregate 
anthropogenic emissions in the base year from LUC (Hamilton 
and Vellen 1999; Fry 2007; Hohne et al. 2007). Australia originally 
signed the Kyoto Protocol because it was likely that carbon sinks 
would reduce the mitigation required to meet the Kyoto Protocol 
target as a concession to emission-intensive energy and export 
sectors (Howard 1997; Crowley 2007; Hohne et al. 2007). The 
‘Australia clause’ resulted in the single largest mitigation activity 
for Australia, with legislative clearing restrictions significantly 
contributing to 83 million tCO2-e of mitigation every year 
(132 – 49 million tCO2-e p.a.) in the NGGI under Kyoto Protocol 
accounting rules (DCC 2009a).
The opportunities for Australia to issue RMUs, alongside the 
base-year concession, in addition to the negotiated target of an 
8% increase in 1990 emissions, produces a lesser impetus for 
Australia to participate with other countries in carbon trading of 
emission reduction units (ERUs). ERUs are equivalent to RMUs 
and AAUs in meeting national Kyoto Protocol targets. However, 
ERUs are issued only by emission reduction at its source, or an 
emission removal with a carbon sink RMU from another Annex I 
(industrialised) country, through the Kyoto Protocol’s ‘joint 
implementation’ (JI) mechanism (Dumanski 2004). Hosting JI 
projects essentially allows Annex I countries to export converted 
AAUs and RMUs as ERUs into the instigating Annex I country 
registry (DCC 2008a). JI participation allows ERUs issued for 
reductions in any of the six major GHGs, and the general rules 
for LULUCF for Annex I countries apply (Hepburn 2007; Hohne 
et al. 2007). 
JI projects aimed at sequestration by sinks are allowed, but the 
credits are capped for forest management (Article 3.4), and cannot 
be banked5 for use after the first commitment period (Hohne et 
al. 2007). Countries have a differentiated amount they are able 
to claim under forest management JI projects, and Australia has 
a zero capacity to claim under Article 3.4. However, in the first 
commitment period, Japan for example can claim up to 13 MtC per 
annum6 in JI ERUs, under the accounting rules for net removals 
for forest management in the first Kyoto Protocol commitment 
4 Including the sub-rule in paragraph 4 of the Annex to Decision 16/CMP.1, relates 
to harvest losses following afforestation and reforestation since 1990. Such losses 
must be equal to or less than credits accounted for on that unit of land. 
5 Banking (or ‘carry over’) in climate change policy refers to the option of holding 
on to units into future commitment periods.
6 Note: 1 tC is equivalent to 3.67 tCO2-e, or 3.67 KP units. 84 Australian carbon biosequestration and bioenergy policy
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period7 (UN and UNFCCC 2002; Hohne et al. 2007). (See Table 1 
for a list of schemes or policies, and their respective units). 
In terms of national registry accounting, if Australia (as the host 
country) and Japan (the instigating country) were to use the JI 
mechanism for point-source reduction, then the abatement would 
result in Australia cancelling AAUs equal to the reduction from 
its national registry. If Australia hosted a Japanese JI reforestation 
activity, then any removal would result in Australia cancelling 
RMUs equal to the removal from its national registry8. Equivalent 
ERUs would be issued to Japan’s national registry to assist 
meeting their Kyoto Protocol national emission target9. Japan 
could also harvest some of the reforested areas—up to the 13 MtC 
per annum. Notably, Australia has chosen not to host JI projects, 
and this long-held Commonwealth Government approach is 
expected to remain until details of domestic agricultural offsets are 
known and international mechanisms after the first Kyoto Protocol 
commitment period become clearer (DCC 2008b). The Rudd 
government, however, did seek to participate in JI, although only 
as an instigating country. The reasoning was to enable Australia 
to meet the nation’s Kyoto Protocol target cost-effectively and 
to encourage comparable domestic carbon prices through trading 
(DCC 2008b, 2009b). As ‘acting in the national interest’ is often 
a guarded strategy, in this case it clearly does little to facilitate 
economic or technical spill-overs from JI activities on Australian 
soil or advance the national capacity to participate in international 
carbon markets. Possibly recognising these benefits, the Gillard 
government has indicated that Australian JI participation as a host 
country will be allowed under the CFI. 
7 The Japanese were early adopters of biosequestration research in Australia, and 
had the Commonwealth Government at the time allowed JI activity in Australia, 
hundreds of millions of dollars may have been invested in revegetation in regional 
and remote Australia.
8 In the forestry project, the reduction would fall under Article 3.3 emissions.
9 If the ERU was converted from an RMU, the ERU cannot be banked.
Globally significant mechanisms and LULUCF mitigation
The incentive for developing new climate-change-related 
markets and policy is to harness the global agricultural economic 
mitigation potential. The global agricultural mitigation potential 
is projected to be 12  000 MtCO2-e per annum by 2030, which 
is comparable to energy supply, transport and industry sector 
potentials (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009; McKinsey and Company 
2009). Globally, existing carbon markets remain strong despite 
the recent global recession and policy uncertainty. International 
carbon markets were valued at over US63 billion in 2007, US135 
billion in 2008 and US144 billion in 2009, but stalled at 142 billion 
in 2010. The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has 
consistently represented between 70% and 80% by value (see 
Table 2). Only very small quantities of JI and CDM volumes and 
values are traded globally. Primary CER10 (pCER) trading fell 
around 30% from 2007 to 2008, and an additional 50% from 2008 
to 2009, while their corresponding value declined by just over 
12% and 60%, respectively. Similarly, ERU trading also fell to 
around half over the period, while market value declined by 25% 
(Capoor and Ambrosi 2009; Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010; Linacre 
et al. 2011). Recent carbon trading preference is for guaranteed 
assets in the EU ETS, and away from pCERs.
On the supply side, CERs and ERUs created from CDM and JI 
projects continue to be constrained by delays in registration and 
issuance, high transaction costs and a post-2012 policy vacuum. 
Amidst such problems, the market share of LULUCF-based 
ERUs and CERs represents less than 1% of global trading. 
This is primarily due to concerns of permanence, accuracy of 
monitoring, reporting requirements and the ability of LULUCF 
ERUs and CERs to create an oversupply. As such, the EU ETS 
excludes LULUCF assets (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009). Australian 
policymakers should note that the mediocre attractiveness and 
or embargo of LULUCF assets internationally does not give 
10 pCERs are CERs that are purchased directly from entities in developing countries 
through the CDM. They contrast with secondary CERs (sCERs) that are financial 
products that do not represent or create emission reductions.
Table 1. Selected forestry-related schemes, associated units and abbreviations 
Activity or scheme  Unit  Abbreviation 
Deforestation (KP
A)  Assigned Amount Unit  AAU 
Forestry (Reforestation) (KP)  Removal Unit  RMU 
MRET/RET  Renewable Energy Certificate  REC 
GGAS  NSW Greenhouse Abatement Certificate  NGAC 
GreenPower  Renewable Energy Certificate  REC 
GF  Verified Emission Reduction  VER 
CPRS  Australian Emission Unit  AEU 
CFI  Australian Carbon Credit Unit  ACCU 
Joint Implementation (KP)   Emission Reduction Unit  ERU 
Clean Development Mechanism (KP)  Certified Emission Reduction  CER 
Clean Development Mechanism (KP)  Temporary CER  tCER 
Clean Development Mechanism (KP)  Long-term CER  lCER 
EU ETS  European Union Allowance   EUA 
EU ETS  Primary Certified Emission Reduction  pCER 
EU ETS  Secondary Certified Emission Reduction  sCER 
CCX  Carbon Financial Instrument  CFI 
AKP is an acronym for the Kyoto Protocol. 85 Mark P. McHenry
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the impression of a long-term policy future for biosequestration 
projects in such massive, and growing, carbon markets.
In a similar fashion to instigating JI projects, the Rudd government 
sought to increase national participation in CDM projects (DCC 
2009c). The government at the time, however, was unwilling 
to partake in CDM forestry projects due to permanence issues. 
Under current Kyoto Protocol rules, CERs issued for afforestation 
or reforestation expire, and must be replaced11 (Hohne et al. 
2007; DCC 2008b). If forestry-related CERs are retired against 
a national target, and there is a reversal of sequestration, 
another Kyoto Protocol unit must replace it when it either losses 
certification or expires. Thus, the Rudd government’s CPRS 
considered that retiring forestry-related CERs against Australia’s 
Kyoto Protocol target would result in an unacceptable exposure 
to a replacement liability (DCC 2008b). As there is no mention 
of CDM participation in the CFI legislation, the perspective of 
LULUCF being a high risk seems to remain. 
As the government also excluded tCERs and lCERs from the 
CPRS, those considering forestry biosequestration may pause to 
consider the risks of contingent obligations and administration 
costs that are unacceptably high for a government. It is clear 
that even when governments have the ability to capitalise on 
LULUCF activities, they have not often pursued them. In 
time, LULUCF assets may be more attractive, with alternative 
international market-based standards and methods similar 
to the California Climate Action Reserve (C-CAR), or the 
Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009). 
Addressing permanence issues by ‘discounting’, ‘deeming’ or 
‘buffer’ methods (akin to the C-CAR and VCS) may protect 
the holder of the asset against hazard events, and offer both a 
simple and credible alternative to Kyoto Protocol methods12. 
Such opportunities also make available several new land-based 
mitigation or conservation options for agriculture and LULUCF 
sectors, biodiversity and soil sequestration activities (Hohne et 
11 tCERs expire after less than two commitment periods, and lCERs may expire 
after between 20 and 60 y, depending on the project.
12 Provided that the sequestration ‘discounting’, ‘deeming’, or ‘buffer’  is con-
ser  va  tive enough to not exceed the actual sequestered carbon remaining after a 
hazard event. 
al. 2007; DCC 2008b; Capoor and Ambrosi 2009; McHenry 
2009). Unfortunately, new approaches at this stage are likely to 
incur resistance, as existing climate-change policy (such as the 
Kyoto Protocol) has significant ‘sunk costs’ and would be likely to 
attract a similar suite of inadequate policies, both internationally 
and domestically (Prins and Rayner 2007). Australia’s own 
sunk cost can be examined through an analysis of market-based 
policy co-evolution and convergence, the respective operational 
complexities, and overall efficacy with respect to mitigation from 
the LULUCF sector.
The evolution of Australian climate policy: 
strategies, markets and targets
The 1992 Keating Labor Commonwealth Government’s National 
Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS) was the first national 
approach to include all sources and sinks of GHGs, across 
every economic sector (Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia 2000). The NGRS was a Commonwealth, state and 
territory government commitment, formally endorsed by the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 1992. The 
NGRS included the 1990 adoption of the interim planning 
target (Toronto Agreement) of reducing GHG emissions by 20% 
from 1998 levels by the year 2005. Subsequent UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations overturned the target (Taplin 1995; 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000). In 1995, 2 y 
prior to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Keating government 
announced additional measures in what became known as the 
‘Greenhouse 21C’ statement. Among several other initiatives, 
this announcement included the Greenhouse Challenge Program 
(GCP).
The GCP was a voluntary initiative between the Commonwealth 
and industry to provide a framework for undertaking and reporting 
GHG abatement activities, including forestry sequestration. In 
1996, the newly elected Howard Liberal  –  National Coalition 
Commonwealth Government continued and extended the 
GCP under the name ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus Program’ 
(GC+P). Out of this program came the first domestic policy that 
recognised carbon biosequestration, Greenhouse FriendlyTM. In 
1997, immediately before the Kyoto Protocol conference, the 
Table 2. Global carbon market value from 2007 to 2009
A. Figures contributing to the totals are in italics. 
Scheme   
Value (million USD) 
2007  2008  2009 
Project based (total)      8195    7297    3370 
    Primary CDM      7433    6511    2678 
    Joint Implementation      499    367    354 
    Voluntary Markets      54    419    338 
Allowance markets (total)      49361    101492    122822 
    EU Emissions Trading Scheme      49065    100526    118474 
    NSW GGAS      224    183    117 
    Chicago Climate Exchange      72    309    50 
    Others    —    474    4182 
Non-project based (total)
B      5451    26277    17543 
Totals (rounded)      63007    135066    143735 
ASources: Capoor and Ambrosi (2009); Kossoy and Ambrosi (2010) 
BIncludes spot and secondary Kyoto offsets 86 Australian carbon biosequestration and bioenergy policy
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Howard government announced the package ‘Safeguarding the 
Future: Australia’s Response to Climate Change’. This package 
introduced the notion of mandatory targets for renewable energy 
in national electricity generation, and initiatives to treble carbon 
sinks in the form of domestic plantations and native revegetation 
by 2020 (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000). 
Concurrently, the New South Wales State Government was 
designing a mechanism to increase renewable energy generation 
in electricity grids, based on a voluntary price-premium, supported 
by a rigorous accreditation process, which included bioenergy 
abatement (DCC 2009a) (see Fig. 1 for an Australian GHG 
mitigation policy timeline).
GreenPower
In NSW, the creation of the Sustainable Energy Development 
Authority (SEDA13) and its development of ‘GreenPower’ in 1997 
aimed to build a domestic renewable energy industry (Parliament 
of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000; NSW Department of 
Water and Energy 2009). GreenPower remains as a national 
voluntary accreditation program, setting stringent environmental 
and reporting standards for renewable energy products offered by 
electricity retailers to households and businesses (GreenPower 
2009a). SEDA’s strict licensing requirements to accredit green 
energy sources, and guidelines, take into account the collateral 
environmental impacts of certain categories of renewable energy 
options (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000). 
While GreenPower does not include biosequestration offsetting, 
it does accredit on a case-by-case basis bioenergy generators that 
13  SEDA was incorporated in the NSW Department of Energy, Utilities and 
Sustainability in 2004, which was subsequently incorporated in the NSW 
Department of Water and Energy in 2007.
consume biomass feedstock, such as cleared specified noxious 
weeds or wood waste from existing sustainably managed forest 
plantations and crops, grown on land cleared prior to 1990 (URS 
Australia Pty Ltd 2008; GreenPower 2009b). 
The longevity and continued growth of GreenPower-accredited 
products demonstrate the importance of the voluntary program 
to Australia. GreenPower is recognised for promoting the 
assimilation of renewable energy and sustainably managed 
plantation policy into households, businesses and government 
utilities (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000). 
The primary mechanism that GreenPower uses to ensure that its 
products are additional to concurrent renewable energy policies is 
to require the surrender of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), 
the tradable entity developed under the Mandatory Renewable 
Energy Target (MRET).
The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET)
The MRET is a ‘baseline and credit’ scheme that uses RECs to 
demonstrate compliance with annual interim renewable energy 
targets. RECs were developed to provide an economic incentive 
to construct new renewable energy generation capacity. Each 
REC has its own unique code, remains valid until surrendered 
against an MRET liability and represents 1 MWh of accredited 
renewable electricity. The penalty payment for non-compliance is 
a non-tax-deductable AUD40 per MWh (IEA 2006). All wholesale 
electricity purchases on electricity networks of more than 100 
MW of installed capacity have had an increasing annual MRET 
liability since 1 April 2001. In order to meet their obligation, liable 
parties (wholesale purchasers) surrender RECs to the Office of 
the Renewable Energy Regulator (ORER). 
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Figure 1. Major Australian climate change and energy market policy timeline (1990–2016)A. 
ASET represents some of the various Australian state electricity targets that were implemented or proposed in response to the perception of MRET becoming an 
inadequate policy around the year 2005. These were designed to be removed after the introduction of a successor to the MRET, known as the RET. In 2010 it was 
announced that the RET was amended to consist of two components as of 2011, the Large RET (LRET) for larger utility-scale electricity generators, and the Small-
scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES), for smaller generation units (SGU) for domestic-sized electricity production (or displacement with solar hot water heaters).87 Mark P. McHenry
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The ORER, a statutory agency, administers The Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) Act 2000, the key legislative instrument of 
the MRET (MacGill et al. 2006). ORER-accredited renewable 
energy generators, including bioenergy generators, derive 
income from both the electricity they generate and the RECs they 
register. Every REC is created by a registered person, registered 
by the Renewable Energy Regulator, validated by the ORER, 
traded between registered persons and eventually surrendered to 
demonstrate compliance with the MRET. Once a REC is created 
it can be placed on a formal market or sold via bilateral deals 
(Kent and Mercer 2006). The MRET’s small national additional 
renewable electricity target (9500 GWh by 2010) developed 
under the Howard government was widely criticised as merely 
maintaining renewable energy market share post-2010. State 
governments subsequently developed various schemes to address 
this shortcoming. At the COAG meeting in December 2007, the 
Rudd Labor Commonwealth Government and state governments 
agreed to work cooperatively to bring the MRET, and the various 
state-based targets, into a single expanded renewable energy 
target (RET). The RET aims to ensure that 20% of Australian 
electricity is generated from renewable sources by 2020. The 
Rudd government viewed the RET as an interim stimulus for 
deployment of renewable energy technology, to be phased out 
between 2020 and 2030 (DCC 2008a).
The MRET and its successors will continue to be a primary 
enabler of the Australian bioenergy sector. The MRETs REC 
price premium created a total of 1 137 530 MWh of certified 
renewable electricity generated from forestry and agricultural-
related waste between 2001 and 2009. This mitigated an estimated 
1 MtCO2-e point-source net emissions from power stations 
(Table 3). A simple estimated carbon value from this small 
subsection of MRET-related agricultural and forestry mitigation 
can be calculated using the non-compliance penalty of AUD40, 
roughly representing the average REC price over the period. This 
abatement cost is about AUD45 per tCO2-e14 over the period. 
While this over-simplified calculation has severe limitations, it 
does demonstrate the creation of differential values of biomass 
14 This rough estimate is an imprecise calculation due to the changing emission 
factors over time for each state, the assumption of a zero point-source emission 
from net accounting, and the omission of transport, harvesting and processing 
emissions, etc. The relatively simple ‘back of the envelope’ calculation was 
undertaken to demonstrate possible linkages between the costs and benefits of 
various policy mechanisms of competing mitigation policy choices.
and carbon in co-existing policies supporting either simple point-
source bioenergy, or biosequestration mitigation.
Greenhouse Friendly™
In addition to the MRET, in 2001, the Howard Commonwealth 
Government launched the Greenhouse Friendly™ (GF) 
voluntary initiative. The initiative sanctioned various mitigation 
options, including certified renewable energy generation and 
biosequestration offsets (DCC 2009d). GF forestry projects 
required ‘permanence’ of at least 70 y and, if removed for any 
reason, obliged restoration to commence within 12 months (AGO 
2006; NSW Government 2008a). Under the GF guidelines, 
projects that avoided forest clearing could have been approved if 
they met the same eligibility criteria as Kyoto Protocol forest sink 
projects, excluding human-induced requirements (AGO 2006). 
By the end of 2008, there were five GF-forestry-approved abate-
ment providers: Greening Australia, Landcare CarbonSMART, 
AusCarbon International, CO2 Australia and Greenfleet. All 
forestry biosequestration activity was located in the eastern states 
(DCC 2009e). At the end of 2009 there were nine GF-forestry-
approved abatement providers (NSW Government 2008a). 
De  spite there being several approved abatement providers, very 
few offsets have been verified—primarily due to the small scale 
of initial sequestration and high costs of verification. The Rudd 
government stated that any future CPRS forestry-based carbon 
biosequestration would be similar to the GF scheme. Therefore, 
the relative attractiveness and deficiencies of the GF model 
may have implications for the level of biosequestration activity 
under any future CPRS. Even so, GF abatement credits (known 
as verified emission reductions, or VERs), will not be fungible 
with the CPRS Australian Emission Units (AEUs), and GF has 
now ceased as well as the GC+P. To make way for the CPRS, 
no new GF abatement project applications were considered after 
4 February 2009. Transitional arrangements for GF participants 
included the continuation of current abatement projects until their 
deed conclusion before 2 July 2010 (DCC 2009e). Therefore, 
those who undertook carbon sequestration projects under GF 
are required by a policy that lasted only 8 y to maintain their 
offset for minimum of 70 y. Similar transitional measures were 
developed for the cessation of one of the largest global carbon 
trading markets for incorporation into the defunct CPRS, the 
pioneering NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme. 
Table 3. MRET certified bioenergy REC generation by source, and estimated point-source mitigation 2001–2009 
(excluding bagasse generation and cogeneration) 
Bioenergy resource
A  RECs  Approximate emissions
B tCO2-e 
Wood waste    1016165  904885 
Waste from processing agricultural products    61930  41016 
Food and agricultural wet waste    46048  555400 
Energy crops    9705  8637 
Crop waste    2282  2077 
Agricultural waste    1400  1708 
Total     1137530  1013862
C 
AThis table excludes the 1551935 and 1751866 valid RECs created from bagasse generation and co-generation activities, 
respectively.  
BUsing the annual emission factors (scope two) for each state electricity grid from the state of creation for each year 
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The Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS)
The NSW GGAS was modelled on the MRET, although it was 
more comprehensive in its coverage. It allowed liable parties 
to achieve targets through renewable energy, decreased carbon 
intensities, energy efficiency or biosequestration options. In 
contrast to the MRET, the scheme units measured tCO2-e 
abated, rather than MWh of renewable energy (ORER 2003). 
GGAS commenced in 2003, and has contributed significantly to 
Australian carbon market intellectual capital. It was renamed in 
2007 by the new NSW Minister of Energy as the Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Scheme, but continued to be known as GGAS. The 
objectives of GGAS were to reduce GHG emissions associated 
with electricity generation and to encourage offsetting activities 
(IPART 2008). The scheme required NSW and Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) electricity retailers, large electricity consumers 
(>  100 GWh of annual demand) and some other minor parties 
who bought and sold electricity to meet mandatory benchmarks 
for reducing or offsetting GHG emissions, relative to their market 
share (DCC 2008a; IPART 2008). GGAS imposed a benchmark of 
7.27 tCO2-e per capita in 2007, from a benchmark of 8.65 tCO2-e 
per capita in 2003 (IPART 2008) (Fig. 2).
Administered by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory 
Tribunal of NSW (IPART), GGAS was a ‘baseline and credit’ 
form of emissions trading. The GGAS registry did not provide a 
trading function. It did, however, manage the creation, transfer of 
ownership and ultimate surrender of tradable GGAS certificates, 
called the NGACs15 (NSW Government 2005; IPART 2008). 
IPART was also the compliance regulator for benchmarking 
(IPART 2008). When participant’s annual emissions exceeded 
their benchmark, they were required to offset emissions via 
surrendering NGACs annually. Any remaining emission liabilities 
incurred the GGAS penalty (IPART 2008; NSW Government 
2008b). GGAS penalties were charged to participants failing 
to comply (beyond the acceptable 10% shortfall that they could 
carry forward) with their benchmark (NSW Government 2008b).
15 LUACs (large user abatement credits) and RECs are also GGAS-tradable units. 
However, RECs are not exactly equivalent to NGACs. By using the GGAS pool 
coefficient for that year, one can convert RECs to NGACs. The value slowly 
increased from around 0.90 to 0.96 (tCO2-e per MWh), from 2003 to 2009, 
respectively.
GGAS registry data indicate that over 20 million NGACs were 
created in 2008, and over 90 million between 2003 and 2008. 
Over 20 million NGACs were surrendered by participants to 
meet their 2008 benchmark obligations, and over 60 million over 
the life of GGAS. The 2008–2009 oversupply of NGACs saw a 
dramatic increase in the rate of voluntary surrenders of NGACs, 
which alongside the uncertainty of the scheme post-2009 led to 
a reduction in value (IPART 2009). (See Fig. 3 for the resulting 
change in NGAC value over time). Between 2007 and 2008 there 
was a ten-fold increase in voluntarily-surrendered NGACs, rising 
from around 50  000 to 488  000, totalling slightly over 545  000 
between 2003 and 2008 (see Table 4).
GGAS and carbon sequestration requirements
GGAS-accredited demand-side abatement (DSA), low-emissions 
generation or forestry sequestration activities (IPART 2008). GGAS 
required that any carbon sequestration activities be undertaken 
in NSW. The Greenhouse Gas Benchmark Rule (Carbon 
Sequestration) amendment, known as the ‘CS Rule’, required that 
the applicant had the ownership or control of registered carbon 
sequestration rights on the title of the land, consistent with Article 
3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol (NSW Government 2005; IPART 2008, 
2009). The CS Rule accounted only for permitted sequestration 
once it had occurred and did not allow NGACs to be generated for 
expected sequestration, and documentary evidence was required to 
establish eligibility (IPART 2008). Eligibility required afforestation 
after 1 January 1990; a carbon pool manager controlling registered 
carbon rights on each title; relevant land use restrictions where 
the afforestation resides; documentation of maintenance or any 
harvesting procedure; and risk management strategies to ensure 
ongoing compliance (NSW Government 2005; IPART 2008). 
Between 2003 and 30 June 2008, there were 3837 NGAC trades 
involving 75 645 926 certificates, of which around half involved 
only 1  442  382 CS Rule NGACs. There was a greater trading 
tendency for very small parcels of CS Rule NGACs than any 
other form of GGAS abatement, possibly reflecting relatively 
high perception of risk (IPART 2008, 2009). In addition, only 
11% of created CS NGACs have been surrendered up to 2008, 
compared with more than two-thirds of all other GGAS certificates 
surrendered over the same period (IPART 2009). The number of 
NGACs created through the CS Rule represented less than 1% 
of total surrenders. Only seven of the 221 NGAC providers were 
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accredited under the CS Rule, and 99% of the CS NGACs were 
created by the Forestry Commission of NSW (IPART 2009). 
Therefore, for whatever reason, there is a comparably low level of 
attractiveness of carbon market forestry biosequestration projects 
and associated certified products. 
In terms of project continuity, the Rudd government viewed 
GGAS forest biosequestration projects as ‘likely’ to be able to 
voluntarily opt into the CPRS, although the permanence of their 
obligations will be retained (DCC 2008a). Amidst the uncertainty, 
the Rudd government decided that some form of assistance was 
appropriate to compensate NGAC holders for the non-fungibility 
between NGACs and CPRSs AEUs for all categories (Capoor 
and Ambrosi 2009).
The CPRS, and CFI and biosequestration
The Rudd government committed to reduce Australian GHG 
emissions to a level 5% below 2000 levels by 2020 uncondi tion ally, 
and by up to 15% in the context of a global agreement wherein 
other major economies strive for comparable reductions (DCC 
2008b). The CPRS, a ‘cap and trade’ scheme, was expected to 
become the primary measure to achieve emission reductions 
domestically (DCC 2008a). The CPRS covered all six GHGs 
considered by the Kyoto Protocol and would capture around 75% 
of Australian emissions, involving mandatory obligations for 
around 1000 domestically operating entities (DCC 2008b). The 
Rudd government planned an AEU cap of AUD40 per tCO2-e, 
rising at a real 5% per annum, and a fixed AUD10 price for the 
proposed first year (2011–2012) (DCC 2008a,b, 2009f). Such a low 
cap, relative to relatively recent high prices on international carbon 
markets, may have resulted in future difficulties in linking of the 
CPRS to international schemes (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009). The 
Rudd government expected the CPRS’s AEU to be worth about 
AUD29 by 2012–2013—around three-quarters of the proposed cap 
(DCC 2009f). As the RET/LRET/SRES would have operated in 
parallel with the CPRS, the significantly smaller abatement cost is 
likely to have caused a depreciation of RECs relative to historical 
REC prices. The further inclusion of emission offsets from sectors 
outside the scheme (such as agriculture) may have resulted in an 
increase in emissions above the CPRS and Kyoto Protocol targets, 
due to a reduction in permit prices (DCC 2008b).
The Rudd government expected the market price of harvested 
wood products to exceed carbon value, suggesting the greatest 
benefits in relation to forestry activities were expected for owners 
of new, unharvested forests, established on less productive or 
marginal land. The CPRS included a retrospective reforestation 
establishment baseline (2008) to protect against perverse clearing 
prior to the introduction of the scheme. It was uncertain, however, 
if the CPRS would balance the potential for perverse protection 
of plantation timber monocultures at the expense of native forest 
exploitation for bioenergy. At the time, the CPRS documentation 
stated it would establish another forestry baseline to the 1990 
Kyoto Protocol, creating additional exemption requirements for 
biosequestration covered by the then existing programs. This 
would penalise early-adopters of reforestation activities outside 
existing programs (DCC 2008b). Conversely, the proposed CPRS 
liability and associated administrative burden was not extended to 
biofuels and bioenergy emissions, including methane combustion 
from landfill facilities. 
In 2008, the Rudd government aimed to commence the CPRS on 1 
July 2010. It was, however, postponed 12 months supposedly due 
to the global recession (DCC 2008b, 2009f; Capoor and Ambrosi 
2009). Finally the CPRS legislation was unable to pass through 
the senate due to lack of bipartisan support. The subsequent failure 
of both the third and final introduction of the CPRS legislation to 
the senate on the 2 February 2010, and the 15th Conference of the 
Parties resulting in the Copenhagen Accord16 in late 2009, has left 
much uncertainty for LULUCF mitigation activities post 201217. 
16 Whether or not the Copenhagen Accord is really a failure will be determined in 
a review in 2015, despite many of the national targets citing a 2020 target date.
17 The international mechanism known as ‘reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation’, or ‘REDD-plus’ remains as a single large international 
mechanism to mobilise funds specifically for the LULUCF sector for mitigation 
in developing countries.
Table 4. NSW GGAS certificates (thousands) created, surrendered and voluntarily surrendered, by rule (2003–2008)
A,B 
Rule   
Year 
  Totals
C 
2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Gen. (created)    6318  6744  7879  9548  12814  12340    55644 
Gen. (surrendered)    1114  4432  7600  9291  9739  10866    43042 
Gen. (voluntary)    —  —  5  —  11  383    399 
DSA (created)    345  742  1509  8934  9928  8130    29589 
DSA (surrendered)    53  606  382  2251  6158  9407    18857 
DSA (voluntary)    —  —  0.1  1  33  73    107 
CS (created)    —  166  538  588  699  675    2666 
CS (surrendered)    —  —  —  50  25  183    258 
CS (voluntary)    —  —  —  1  6  32    40 
LUAC (created)    —  —  94  790  1286  1298    3468 
LUAC (surrendered)    —  —  64  687  1040  1141    2932 
LUAC (voluntary)    —  —  —  —  —  —    — 
Total created     6333  7652  10021  19861  24726  22443    91367 
ASource: IPART 2009 
BWhere ‘LUAC’ are ‘large user abatement credits’, ‘CS’ are ‘carbon sequestration credits’, ‘DSA’ are ‘demand-side abatement credits’, and 
‘Gen.’ are ‘generation credits’.  
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The most recent proposed Australian LULUCF-related mitigation 
policy is the Gillard government’s Carbon Farming Initiative. 
The CFI is a market-based scheme that uses a unit called an 
Australian Carbon Credit Unit (ACCU), equivalent to 1 tCO2-e. If 
implemented, the Gillard government believes the CFI will be able 
to mitigate between 5 and 15 Mt tCO2-e from Article 3.3 activities 
up to 2020 (DCCEE 2011). Based on historical policy efficacy, this 
is likely to be an overestimate. The CFI policy design relies heavily 
on 2008 and 2009 CPRS modelling and mechanistic assumptions, 
yet introduces a particularly complex methodology for the LULUCF 
sector. The available CFI literature suggests the Gillard government 
is well aware of the large number of assumptions, uncertainties, 
compliance obligations and the complexities of various proposed 
verification methodologies associated with the large range of 
LULUCF-related projects proposed to be incorporated in the CFI. 
The literature gives il lustra tive examples of a wide range of eligible 
activities; these are essentially environmental activities that aim to 
create a range of benefits often unrelated to mitigation. Examples 
of bio  sequestra  tion and ‘emission avoidance activities’ include 
vegetative management, promotion of residual seed sources, 
coppicing, feral animal culling, enteric fermentation augmentation 
and seasonal burning of savannahs. Incorporating such a range 
of activities in a single scheme risks introducing unnecessary 
com  plexity in measurement, baselines and subsequent verifi  ca  tion. 
In theory, the resultant uncertainty for the wide range of eligible 
activities will influence the value of ACCUs, which will in turn 
be influenced by Australia’s naturally variable climate. As with 
other carbon markets, however, it is likely that market uncertainties 
and other fundamentals will be dominated by political influence. 
Furthermore, the CFI is proposed to operate with a small buffer 
(only 5% at present) of withheld ACCUs from each project as a 
small level of insurance against inadvertent loss considering the 
Australian climate. Sequestration projects are expected to remain 
as ‘permanent’ generally for 100 y, with a maximum reporting 
interval of 5 y. Yet CFI project proponents are likely to be able to 
terminate projects at any time, with the total number of ACCUs 
to be repaid to the CFI administrator upon termination (DCCEE 
2011; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2011). Such 
terminations may become common, with biosequestration activities 
as small as 1 ha proposed to be allowed in the CFI increasing 
administrative requirements for the government. The inclusion of 
such micro-scale LULUCF activities indicates the CFI may become 
an inefficient mitigation policy with a high administrative burden 
to proponents and taxpayers.
In terms of market compatibility, the Gillard government states 
that ACCUs will be compatible with a variety of carbon markets 
(Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2011). However, 
the ACCUs derived from Article 3.3 activities (akin to RMUs) 
will be small, and countries that will accept such ACCUs as 
banking of RMUs or ERUs—converted from either RMUs, 
tCERs or lCERs—are not allowed in most international markets. 
Nonetheless, ACCUs creation is expected to be consistent with 
the National Carbon Offset Standard, which is itself heavily 
based on Kyoto Protocol mitigation definitions and units. 
The standard itself does not delve into RMUs or LULUCF 
verification methods at a particularly detailed level. The CFI 
allows both voluntary cancellation and international sale of 
ACCUs (but which is likely to be limited in any case) which 
will not be used to meet Australia’s international obligations 
(Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2011). Finally, at 
risk of over-speculating about individual proposed policies and 
compatibility and convergence, this research presents aspects 
of the recent Australian policy convergence experience. The 
over-riding aim is to prevent policy problems recurring in future 
LULUCF-related policy developments.
The Australian experience of complementarity 
and convergence 
State and territory governments were encouraged by the Rudd 
government to terminate GGAS and other non-complementary 
schemes. GGAS legislation was amended in 2006 to terminate 
at the commencement of the national CPRS (IPART 2008; NSW 
Government 2008b). At the cessation of GGAS, energy efficiency 
projects would have been unable to generate NGACs for avoided 
emissions. On 18 June 2008, however, the NSW Premier and 
Minister for Climate Change announced the NSW Energy 
Efficiency Trading (NEET) policy to maintain GGAS DSA Rule 
activities (NSW Government 2008b). NEET was renamed to the 
Energy Savings Scheme (ESS), and the initial start date changed 
from 1 January to 1 July 2009 (IPART 2008, 2009), and GGAS 
DSA Rule-accredited certificate providers and initiatives have 
transferred to the ESS (NSW Government 2008b; IPART 2009). 
The Rudd government stated that it would allow GGAS forestry 
CS projects to opt into the proposed CPRS, provided they met 
eligibility requirements (DCC 2008b). The CPRS forestry-based 
biosequestration was to be built on the GF scheme structure, 
which will affect around AUD14 million in abatement projects 
from the seven GGAS CS certificate-providers if the CPRS or a 
similar mechanism is eventually implemented. The differences 
between GF and GGAS biosequestration project standards include 
undiscounted GF carbon assets, when the relatively conservative 
GGAS ‘70 percent Rule’ provided a carbon accounting buffer. 
Also, under GGAS the liability fell on the seller of the NGAC, 
whereas GF liabilities could be transferred to either party under 
contract. Moreover, the financial additionality test for GF forestry 
offsets was not existent in the GGAS scheme (NSW Government 
2008a). These seemingly arbitrary differences between co-existing 
mechanisms have resulted in fundamental incompatibilities during 
subsequent policy integration. In order to prevent such issues 
arising and reduce the administrative burden and uncertainty 
for participants, a clear knowledge of existing mechanisms and 
outcomes nationally and internationally is required in the policy 
development process to improve trans-mechanism transferability.
While the GGAS scheme credits were traded internationally on 
the EU ETS, the transfer of the proposed CPRS’s AEUs into 
international markets was not to be allowed in the early years. 
Kyoto Protocol units were deemed to be allowed for the proposed 
CPRS compliance domestically, except AAUs, a rule that was 
to be reviewed after 2012–2013. RMUs were to be eligible for 
CPRS compliance if they were issued and surrendered in the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. As few countries are 
able to generate RMUs, however, the potential trade in RMUs 
would have been small within a CPRS. The CPRS was to allow 
AAUs to be banked without restriction, while banking of RMUs 
or ERUs, converted from either RMUs, tCERs, or lCERs, was not 
to be allowed. ERUs were to be recognised for compliance under 
the CPRS, although the Rudd government stated that Australia 
would not host JI projects in sectors covered by the CPRS (DCC 91 Mark P. McHenry
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2008b). The Commonwealth Government’s reasoning behind 
allowing unlimited numbers of eligible Kyoto Protocol units in 
the CPRS was to promote technology transfer, support Kyoto 
Protocol architecture, control domestic compliance costs and to 
facilitate Australian involvement in international carbon markets. 
The eligible units included those external to formal Kyoto Protocol 
flexibility mechanism markets (DCC 2008b). This reasoning 
seems to be at odds with the logic of disallowing JI activities 
to occur on Australian soil. The facilitation of technology and 
knowledge transfer from revegetation in remote Australia would 
be likely to increase Australian participation in international 
carbon markets.
On the 1 January 2008 the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a 
voluntary carbon exchange, stated that mitigation projects already 
accounted for in national inventories for internationally agreed 
commitments and that have implemented domestic ‘cap and 
trade’ systems, will be ineligible to create CCX Carbon Financial 
Instruments (CFIs) (Chicago Climate Exchange 2008). Similarly, 
international non-Kyoto Protocol units such as CFIs were not 
acceptable for the proposed CPRS compliance in the pre-2013 
period (DCC 2008b). If, however, Australia continues to exclude 
Article 3.4 emissions in Kyoto Protocol reporting and from any 
future ‘cap and trade’ system occurring after the potential carbon 
tax, Australian LULUCF mitigation activities may still be eligible 
to trade on markets such as the Chicago Climate Exchange. 
This assumes appropriate bilateral agreements and methods are 
developed18 (McHenry 2009). 
Any overlap between mitigation schemes will be likely to incur 
additional compliance costs, even when meeting one liability 
discharges another (AGO 2003). Such parallel compliance costs 
may exceed the expected abatement benefits, reduce participation 
or even markedly increase mitigation costs or energy prices 
(Wilkins 2008). While a diversity of climate-change or carbon 
markets offer choice, increase competition and develop accounting 
rigor, a convergence of markets and standards that retain the most 
18 Article 3.4 emissions include those from all managed native forests, revegetation 
that does not meet forest criteria, and carbon stored in soil or vegetation on grazing 
or crop lands (DCC 2008c).
advantageous qualities will be likely to increase participation 
(Illum and Meyer 2004; Capoor and Ambrosi 2009). In any case, 
the large number of new markets, the variability of their eligibility 
rules and the sequestration price volatility that has occurred in 
recent years demonstrate a high commercial risk to LULUCF 
biosequestration project proponents. Furthermore, the actual 
level of mitigation achieved by the LULUCF-related policies 
implemented in Australia to date does not bolster confidence. 
Efficacy of Australian LULUCF mitigation policy
The primary aim of climate-change policy is to achieve emission 
reductions as efficiently as possible. Table 5 shows the historical 
efficacy of Australian mitigation policies over time, including 
market and non-market mitigation alternatives. Taking into 
account the calculation assumptions and intrinsic uncertainties, 
it effectively demonstrates the massive mitigation potential of 
simple clearing legislation19, despite the nuances of the accounting 
method and policy implications. Conversely, both active and 
passive forestry sequestration attained small gains in mitigation20. 
The forestry-related activities that were captured in market 
mechanisms such as GGAS, GF and MRET are a very small 
component of total biologically-based mitigation in Australia. 
This is likely to be indicative of inefficient market accreditation 
procedures, high costs of compliance and long-term uncertainty 
of LULUCF options and policy, relative to point-source technical 
alternatives.
Whilst detailed assessments of the efficacy of each respective 
LULUCF mitigation policy mechanism is outside the scope of 
this work, the author notes that mitigation alone is not indicative 
of successful land use policy. For instance, highly productive 
food-producing regions may not be the most appropriate 
19  The author means ‘simple’ from the perspective of policy mechanism 
development. Politically, land-clearing legislation is notoriously difficult to 
introduce, and is a particularly blunt instrument. 
20 While the deforestation mitigation calculation is based on the contentious KP 
‘Australia clause’, it does demonstrate the utility of a relatively efficacious and 
simple regulatory mitigation measure. Land clearing in Australia still occurs, 
however, and remains as an emission liability.
Table 5. Australian LULUCF-related policy mitigation efficacy 
Activity or scheme  Active data 
Total no.  
of years 
Approximate total mitigation 
(MtCO2-e) 
Average annual mitigation  
(MtCO2-e) 
Deforestation
A  1990–2008  19  1519.135
C   79.954
C 
Forestry (reforestation)
A  1990–2008  19  239.208  12.589 
MRET
B  2001–2009  08  1.014  0.126 
GGAS  2003–2008  06  2.666  0.444 
GreenPower
B  1997–2007  09  3.869  0.430 
GF  2001–2009  08  <1
D  0.125
D 
CPRS/CFI  ?  —  —  — 
ACumulative data derived from the Australian NGGI (KP accounting), and 2008 data from DCC (2009a)  
BUsing the annual emission factors (scope two) for each state electricity grid from the state of creation, for each year 
CUses 1990 NGGI deforestation (132.159 MtCO2-e) as the baseline, and subtracts the annual deforestation emissions to obtain mitigation 
activity from deforestation reduction 
DOf the 20 GF program-approved projects before 2008, there were only two forestry abatement providers. At that time the estimated 
annual program mitigation was 1.8 MtCO2-e, and the author suggests that forestry mitigation projects would contribute less than  
1 MtCO2-e over the interval, based on similar forestry policy contributions (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008). At the end of 2009, there were 
nine GF-approved forestry abatement project providers; none had yet submitted claims for approval of abatement or independent 
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loca  tions in which to foster large-scale forestry carbon sinks. 
Predictable rates of LUC in rural areas should also be of concern 
to policymakers. Thus policy mechanisms designed to harness 
the agricultural–forestry mitigation potential must be stable 
over the long term, as any gains can be quickly reversed from 
LUC activities. Figure 4 demonstrates the relative volatility of 
existing and past policy carbon-related markets and the spread 
of mitigation value. Of interest are the two Australian ‘baseline 
and credit’ schemes, MRET/RET’s RECs and GGAS’s NGACs. 
While clearly exhibiting less volatility than the EU’s ETS units 
(EUAs), the RECs and NGACs seemingly are unrelated, or may 
even be interpreted as showing inverse mitigation values over 
time. In contrast to fundamentals of LULUCF biosequestration 
costs, the value of mitigation in recent markets is highly sensitive 
to policy preferences and market designs. Thus policymakers 
must be careful when designing initial conditions and options to 
refine market performance over time, especially for reversible 
gains from the agricultural and LULUCF sectors. 
Future climate-change policy should seek to avoid imposing 
unresponsive arrangements that are complex in nature and 
insensitive to economic differences between regions. Such 
outcomes create considerable differentiated compliance 
costs between adherents, and uncertainty between competing 
opportunities (Babiker et al. 2002). As Hamilton and Vellen 
(1999) documented, the ‘Australia clause’ divergence from 
the Kyoto Protocol additionality principals sets a discouraging 
precedent that exploits complexities to create exemptions. This 
precedent may prove problematic in future international climate 
negotiations, even for sectors outside LULUCF. As in past 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the same ‘constructive ambiguity’ 
that endorsed LULUCF activities is expected to broker deals 
in the future. However, as with the LULUCF sector, there are 
likely to be unforeseen burdens to manage in a complex policy 
environment (Hohne et al. 2007). Therefore, the best policy may 
be the simplest policy.
Fundamental criteria for prudent LULUCF mitigation 
policy
This research has distilled five relatively simple criteria to assist 
LULUCF biosequestration and bioenergy policymakers to avoid 
past policy oversights. These criteria are by no means detailed, 
yet collate findings from the Australian biosequestration and 
bioenergy experience to date.
1.  As biosequestration and bioenergy are fundamentally a 
component of a biological system, they exhibit complex 
characteristics that will be more difficult and expensive to 
quantify than abiotic systems. Therefore, both additional 
rigour and flexibility must be introduced into region-specific 
mitigation verification methods that must also incorporate 
other local land use priorities (stable property values, salinity 
containment, food and water security, biodiversity protec-
tion, etc.). Such a regionally-appropriate perspective can be 
used to develop a simple deeming policy method (to avoid 
the duplication of detailed biosequestration verification) that 
balances certainty for project proponents, investors, emission 
liability holders and local communities.
2.  Forestry biosequestration markets have largely failed to pro-
duce any meaningful mitigation in Australia in two decades 
since the Kyoto 1990 baseline. Whilst liquid or leveraged 
financial instruments may assist the function of bioseques-
tration and bioenergy markets, such policy mechanisms 
introduce a problematic level of short-term volatility that 
is at odds with the long-term temporal realities of forestry 
assets, productive land values and climate change generally. 
Highly volatile markets risk long-term forestry asset ‘gam-
ing’ in a temporally asymmetrical biosequestration process: 
long-term asset development and maintenance, in contrast to 
an essentially instantaneous harvest or loss.
3.  Insular development of complex national biosequestration 
policies has unnecessarily increased administrative burdens 
and uncertainty for participants, and also generated fun-
damental incompatibilities during subsequent attempts to 
integrate policies. A clear understanding of the mechanics 
of co-existing mechanisms will improve fungibility of biose-
questration activities nationally and internationally.
4.  Baseline and credit-tradable quota schemes (such as the 
MRET/RET) are least-cost policies that can promote bioen-
ergy industry development (or at least assist co-firing forestry 
wastes with coal) with targeted amendments. Such amend-
ments may simply be the development of a subcategory of 
REC specifically providing an additional premium for verified 
suitable waste biomass utilisation in large-scale stationary 
thermal generators. This avoids much of the ‘non-commodity’ 
uncertainties of biosequestration quantification, and directly 
and verifiably displaces emissions from the single largest 
sectoral emitter in Australia. 
5.  Federalisation of region- or state-based LULUCF mitiga-
tion policy has resulted in stagnation of policy development 
and implementation in Australia (by all major parties or 
coalitions). Regionally efficient mitigation and adaptation 
within a diverse and geographically differentiated LULUCF 
landscape seems to be largely incompatible with a national 
Australian policy approach. Mechanistically similar state-
Figure 4. NGAC, RECs and EUA (Phase I and Phase II Dec. 2008) values 
from June 2003 to October 2009 (AUD). (MRET RECs are represented 
in terms of tCO2-e, and were calculated in terms of an available annual 
average emission factors (scope 2) for each state’s electricity network. 
EUA values were converted using an average monthly exchange rate.)
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based mechanisms that are synergistic with regional land-
use planning policy and infrastructure will be more likely to 
promote LULUCF mitigation activities that create external 
regional benefits. 
Conclusions
Whilst a national approach streamlines the diverse array of 
mitigation initiatives to reduce administrative, monitoring and 
compliance burden (Wilkins 2008), this streamlining must be 
done judiciously as to not erase decades of regionally-appropriate 
mitigation policy development. Based on circumstantial data, 
successive Commonwealth Governments have been unable to 
achieve national LULUCF mitigation. The Commonwealth 
Government’s approach to international negotiation and domestic 
climate change engagement is likely over the medium term to 
remain oscillating between political parties in power (McDonald 
2005; Crowley 2007). Therefore, resigning LULUCF mitigation 
policy to the Commonwealth seems to be an unwise strategy in 
the medium term. In contrast, geographical differentiation has 
stimulated policy innovation from parallel state and territory 
engagement with the Commonwealth. 
Notwithstanding resurfacing grievances regarding appropriateness 
of target-setting, government behaviour, interest groups, policy 
appropriateness and even Kyoto Protocol mechanisms themselves, 
Australian policymakers require complementary political, judicial 
and regulatory structures that can capture and harness firms and 
individuals to serve international obligations (Babiker et al. 2002; 
Prins and Rayner 2007). The inherent biological nature of the 
LULUCF sector is likely to require a diverse multi-jurisdictional, 
multi-disciplinary capability to balance factional preferences and 
enable regionally efficient mitigation and adaptation. The last 
two decades of policy development demonstrate that complex 
policies—even if they can be implemented in the first place—may 
generate only relatively inconsiderable LULUCF mitigation. 
A sensible simplification of the proposed suite of LULUCF 
biosequestration and bioenergy mitigation policy mechanisms 
seems prudent. This is based squarely on the innate physical 
uncertainty of biological systems interacting with a market-
based trading model overlayed with political influences. The 
substitution of overly complex LULUCF accounting methods 
for biomass and biosequestration activities towards discounting, 
deeming or buffer policies may be a necessary direction (Hamilton 
and Vellen 1999; Hohne et al. 2007). Based on past policy 
efficacy, these alternatives are more likely to provide a balance 
between responsiveness, simplicity, and sensitivity to economic 
and regional differences that harness the diverse Australian 
landscape’s considerable biological mitigation potential. Ideally, 
global mitigation policy co-evolution involving biological systems 
could take an example from biological convergent evolution 
where dissimilar entities adapt to their unique environment 
using remarkably similar approaches that may not be perfect, but 
manage the common task.
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